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tices' decisionmaking process, highlighting Justice Powell's change 
of mind concerning the form of the Court's judgment. But at least 
in my view, Schwartz's findings did not justify a book.4 
STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION. 
By G. Alan Tarrt and Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter.2 New Ha-
ven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1988. Pp. 288. $28.50 
Michael C. Tolley3 
Before the so-called "new judicial federalism," state supreme 
courts and state constitutional law were largely ignored in the study 
of public law and the judicial process. However, as more and more 
lawyers discover that conservative federal judges are unsympathetic 
to federal constitutional claims, and come to rely increasingly on 
state constitutional provisions in cases before state courts, 4 the 
study of state appellate courts takes on new importance. Thanks to 
several innovative works, scholarship about state supreme courts 
and state constitutional law has begun to respond to this demand. 
State Supreme Courts in State and Nation is the second work 
on state supreme courts by the same authors.s Porter and Tarr 
rightly assume that there is no one type of state supreme court. 
"Because there is no typical state supreme court, there can be no 
typical role for a state supreme court in either the state or national 
arenas." What are the roles of state supreme courts? How are the 
roles of these institutions affected by legal and extra-legal factors? 
With these questions as their guide, the authors set out to identify 
the causes and consequences of the similarities and differences in 
state appellate courts. 
One of the book's central themes is that the diversity among 
state supreme courts is due to both national and intrastate factors. 
To pinpoint these factors, the authors focus on three supreme 
courts (Alabama, Ohio, and New Jersey) chosen simply because 
4. I find it difficult to understand why Schwartz did not simply include Bakke among 
the several cases that he addresses in his other-and considerably more interesting-recent 
book, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE BURGER COURT. 
I. Professor and Chair of Political Science, Rutgers University-Camden. 
2. Professor Emerita of Political Science, Barat College. 
3. Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science, Northeastern University. 
4. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protections of Individual Rights, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Symposium: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 
TEX. L. REv. 1141 (1985). Cf THE BURGER COURT (V. Blasi ed. 1983). 
5. STATE SUPREME COURTS: POUCYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (Porter and 
Tarr eds. I 982). 
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each has had an intermediate appeals court since 1945 and "dis-
play[s] political, legal, cultural, and demographic diversity."6 My 
only objection to the authors' decision to focus on these three states 
is that they insisted upon excluding states which did not have inter-
mediate appeals courts before 1945, a criterion which excluded 
more than half the states. 1 
The authors obviously tried to model their work on V.O. Key's 
1949 classic, Southern Politics in State and Nation. The temptation 
to replicate Key's research method is understandable given the suc-
cess of his "comparative case study" approach. It would be unfair 
to judge Porter and Tarr by the exceptionally high standard set by 
Key; not suprisingly, their book lacks the breadth and depth of 
Key's work. Although Key examined eleven states and Porter and 
Tarr only three, both works show originality in the interpretation of 
intrastate factors and display the same reluctance to draw broad 
conclusions. 
In the preface, Porter and Tarr outline their three objectives: 
(I) [T]o adopt [Key's] model to a comparative analysis of state supreme courts 
and of their roles in the lives of the American states, 
(2) [T]o identify the range of variation in state supreme court activity and be-
gin to explore the causes and consequences of that variety, and 
(3) [T]o explore those factors that have precipitated changes in the roles played 
by particular courts as well as those broader factors producing change on all courts. 
The close fit between approach and subject matter gives the work a 
methodological coherence which distinguishes this study from sin-
gle case studies,s judicial impact studies,9 and systems analysis.Io In 
the authors' words, 
[t]he comparative case study approach we employ represents a fundamental depar-
ture in the analysis of state supreme courts. To place our case studies in perspec-
tive, however, it is necessary to begin with an overview of state supreme courts' 
relationships with federal courts (vertical judicial federalism), with their sister 
courts in other states (horizontal judicial federalism), and with other governmental 
6. !d. at 63-4. The following studies assured Porter and Tarr that the three state 
supreme courts they chose exhibited enough diversity to make comparative analysis meaning-
ful: Kagan, The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REv. 961 (1978); Kagan, 
The Business of State Supreme Courts, 30 STAN. L. REV. 125 (1977); and D. ELAZAR, AMER-
ICAN fEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES (1966). 
7. As late as 1975, only twenty-three states had intermediate courts of appeals. 
8. E.g., T. MORRIS, THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND 
POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1975); C. SHELDON, A CENTURY OF JUDGING: A POLITICAL HIS-
TORY OF THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT (1988). 
9. E.g., G. TARR, JUDICIAL IMPACT AND STATE SUPREME COURTS (1977); Canon, 
Reactions of State Supreme Courts to a U.S. Supreme Court Civil Liberties Decision, 8 LAW & 
Soc. REv. 109 (1973); Vines, Southern State Supreme Courts and Race Relations, 18 WEST-
ERN POUT. Q. 5 (1965). 
10. E.g., H. GLICK & K. VINES, STATE COURT SYSTEMS (1973). 
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institutions within the state. For each set of relationships. we look first to the legal 
factors structuring them. then to the extralegal factors influencing them, and fi. 
nally-where appropriate-to significant developments in substantive law. 
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Chapter I, "Judicial Federalism and State Supreme Courts," is 
an excellent survey of the literature on state courts. Bringing to-
gether the works of other researchers, Porter and Tarr summarize 
the findings of the leading studies. The problem with these earlier 
studies, the authors argue, is that they emphasized either state court 
relations with (1) federal courts, (2) other state courts, or (3) other 
institutions of state government. Porter and Tarr, in contrast, view 
all three together. It is this broader context which enables the au-
thors to "analyze the patterns of uniformity and variation, con-
tinuity and change." 
In Chapter II, "State Supreme Courts and Governance," 
Porter and Tarr present an overview of the "intrastate legal con-
text" which includes the work of state supreme courts, the sub-
stance of state law, and the effect of interstate factors such as the 
national civil rights and judicial reform movements. "[T]o under-
stand how state supreme courts participate in governance, one must 
look at them as institutions of state government, interacting with 
and both influencing and being influenced by other political actors 
in the state." This is, in essence, the old "systems analysis" frame-
work, 11 but with a novel twist. By extending the boundaries of the 
system to include the interaction of state supreme courts with fed-
eral and sister state courts, Porter and Tarr show how both intra 
and interstate factors influence the "institutional identity" of state 
supreme courts. 
Chapter III, "Alabama: The Court That Came in From the 
Cold," is the first of three case studies included in this work. In this 
chapter, Porter and Tarr sketch the history of the state judiciary 
and describe the court's relationship with the federal courts and 
other branches of state government. The court's role evolved: 
Where the old court performed a legitimating. supportive, even sycophantic 
function vis-a-vis the other branches of government and the dominant political, so-
cial, and economic forces within the state, the new court is far more independent, 
far more willing to take initiatives, far more mindful and respectful of the federal 
judiciary, more interested in utilizing precedent from other states, and certainly 
more sympathetic to civil liberties claims. 
This approach is repeated in Chapter IV, "Ohio: Partisan Justice" 
and in Chapter V, "New Jersey: The Legacy of Reform." 
II. Cf D. EASTON, A FRA~IEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1965); S. GOLDMAN 
& T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COCRTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM (3rd ed. 1985); W. MUR-
PHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964). 
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In the concluding chapter, "State Supreme Courts in Perspec-
tive," Porter and Tarr summarize the results of their case studies. 
Perhaps their most substantial finding is that state supreme courts 
develop distinctive "institutional identities" in response to specific 
legal and political developments within their states: 
Our account of the political and legal development of the Alabama, Ohio, and 
New Jersey supreme courts documents the distinctiveness of each court and the 
persistence of certain intracourt continuities over time. Each court has developed 
its own understanding of its responsibilities-its particular jurisprudential orienta-
tion and attitude toward legal change, its relationship to other political and legal 
institutions, and its pattern of intracourt interaction. These continuities permit one 
to refer to, for example, the Ohio court's tradition of partisanship and the New 
Jersey court's continuing commitment to reformist activism. This orientation to-
ward judicial responsibilities and toward the court's function, which is internalized 
by the members of a court and reflected in their actions, we refer to as the court's 
institutional identity. 
In each of the case studies a conspicuous shortcoming is the 
authors' reliance upon data from earlier studies. For example, in 
describing the backgrounds and experiences of state supreme court 
justices, Porter and Tarr rely on the work of Glick and Vines which 
is now fifteen years old. The only time the authors rely upon data 
from their own investigations is in calculating dissent rates on the 
Alabama high court. The neglect of current caseload data and sta-
tistical studies of judicial decision making on the high courts of Ala-
bama, Ohio, and New Jersey is unfortunate, for the results surely 
would have helped us to appraise the "uniformity and diversity" 
hypothesis. 
Porter and Tarr also fail to discuss substantive developments in 
a number of important areas of state law. State appellate courts 
perform two quite different functions: the "private function" which 
ensures that justice is done to litigants in each individual case and 
the "public function" which is the development of state law. As the 
appellate court structure matures with the creation of an intermedi-
ate court of appeals and a supreme court with an all certiorari 
docket, the need to exercise the "private," or error correction, func-
tion decreases and the time and energy that a state supreme court 
can devote to its "public function" increases. Unfortunately, the 
comparative case study approach is not very helpful in uncovering 
the principles guiding and controlling the development of state law. 
By not reaching these issues of state constitutionalism, the authors 
diminish the importance of the "public function" and uncon-
sciously perpetuate the myth that state supreme courts are incapa-
ble of developing a principled state constitutional jurisprudence. 
Despite these flaws, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation 
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successfully combines the richness of individual case studies with 
the need to generalize from broad comparisons. In demonstrating 
the potential of the comparative case study approach, the authors 
challenge future researchers to discover the peculiar "institutional 
identities" of state supreme courts across the nation. 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORI-
CAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION. By Robert L. 
Cord.! Baker Book House. 1988. Originally published: 
Lambeth Press, 1982. Pp. 302. $19.95. 
CHRISTIANITY AND THE STATE. By Rousas John 
Rushdoony. Ross House Books. 1986. Pp. 192. 
Steven D. Smith 2 
If book reviews carried subtitles, this one could be called "The 
Mechanic and the Manichee." Those terms suggest the character, 
and the shortcomings, of Professor Robert Cord's and Dr. Rousas 
Rushdoony's respective efforts to examine the issues of religious 
freedom from a historical perspective. Each book has its merits. 
Professor Cord pulls together a mass of (sometimes) helpful histori-
cal data to deflate some mischievous historical myths. Dr. 
Rushdoony offers unorthodox (and therefore potentially valuable) 
insights and perspectives. The critical comments that follow should 
not be understood as disparaging these achievements. For different 
reasons, however, neither book establishes a genuine conversation 
with the past. Hence, neither book finds a historical antidote for the 
current doctrinal and theoretical malaise. 
I 
A book may be unpersuasive without being unimportant. And 
in fact, Cord's is an important book that imparts an important 
truth. The book is important because it has become a cornerstone 
of sorts for the "nonpreferentialist" school of establishment clause 
jurisprudence-a school that claims among its adherents the cur-
rent Chief Justice.3 The important truth that emerges from Cord's 
I. Attorney. 
2. Associate Professor of Law. University of Colorado. 
3. The Rehnquist dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985). adopts Cord's 
position that the establishment clause was intended to prevent establishment of a national 
church but was not intended to prevent public aid to religion so long as such aid is non prefer-
